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Americans prefer that individuals support themselves through their own hard work. They realize, though, that forces beyond the control of any individual may intervene. When people are faced with threats to their ability to earn a living, Americans favor government intervention—including intervention to help secure health care, respectable retirement pensions, and relief from deep poverty.

Ensuring health to pursue opportunity.

Many Americans are not healthy enough to take advantage of the opportunities available in our society. Most Americans may not know the statistical details, but they understand the basic idea that health insurance is necessary to pursue opportunity. The former backbone ofAmerican health insurance—employer-sponsored coverage—has rapidly eroded, with its reach declining from 68 percent of the nonelderly population to 62 percent in just the seven years between 2000 and 2006. This impacted nearly six million Americans.

Overall, three-quarters of Americans have consistently supported expansion of federal government health-care programs since at least 1994, and growing majorities have supported the government taking responsibility for everyone having health coverage.

Helping the poor, when all else fails.

Americans prefer that individuals make it on their own. They oppose guaranteed income without work for those who are not old or physically disabled. They are also socially conservative, disliking childbearing by single mothers and especially by teenagers.

Nonetheless, Americans do support government assistance when people fall into poverty, which happens more often in the United States than in any other advanced industrialized country. More than one in ten Americans—thirty-six million people—are poor, with 40 percent classified as “severely poor” by the U.S. Census because they fail to make it even halfway to the poverty line. Many of the poor are children, who, through no fault of their own, face tremendous obstacles to pursuing the American Dream unless they get government help.

Agreement on antipoverty measures—like all the other policy areas we have considered—cuts across lines of race as well as class. The propositions that “government must see that no one is without food, clothing, or shelter” and that respondents’ own tax dollars should be used “to help pay for food stamps and other assistance to the poor” were supported by very large majorities of whites, nonwhites, low-income whites, and unskilled white workers, as well as by Republicans, Democrats, the middle class, and the more affluent.

Several themes are important in the development of social welfare in the United States before the Social Security Act of 1935. First, the responsibility for the provision of social welfare services shifted from the local level—the town or county—to the state. （The Social Security Act would make the federal government, as well, an important actor in social welfare.） In addition, the purposes of social welfare programs shifted. At times, social welfare services were designed to relieve and control the poor. At other times, social welfare services compensated veterans who had contributed to the preservation, expansion, and development of the nation. During the late nineteenth century, the development of the rural West provided an important objective. By the Progressive Era, the prevention of social problems became animportant objective.

The history of social welfare in the United States is, in part, a story of the transfer of the location and control of social welfare services from rural areas to metropolitan areas. The United States was an agricultural nation before the twentieth century, and most people lived in rural areas. During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the proportion of Americans living in urban areas increased steadily. State governments provided an increasing range of social services and funded and regulated many services delivered at the local level. The financing and control of social services shifted as population shifted from rural to urban areas, in a process that some social scientists have called modernization. At the same time, the economic and communal development of rural areas was an objective of national policy during the nineteenth century. Development implied the transfer of assets to prospective settlers and investment by the state or federal government in education, transportation, and community development. Thus, asset-building and social investment to meet the needs of immigrant families, often to the detriment of indigenous populations, dominated American social policy before 1900.

A locality’s level of development affected its social welfare programs. The English Poor Law, affirmed by the colonial legislatures, made poor relief a local responsibility. Masters were responsible for providing care or discipline when slaves or indentured servants were involved. Otherwise, it was up to colonial towns and counties to devise programs for the poor, frail, and deviant, programs that were appropriate for their level of social and economic development. In many rural areas, poor relief arrangements were informal. Often, local authorities used households to deliver services by boarding the dependent poor. Eventually, poorhouses, jails, and in some cases schools and hospitals, operated by town or county governments, opened as commercial farming and towns succeeded subsistence farming. Local governments added these amenities to provide more efficient handling of the increasing numbers of poor that accompanied economic development.

Early National Period

After the American Revolution, Congress maintained a liberal land policy to promote settlement. A land-rich and cash-poor federal government used public land sales to finance a variety of public projects, subsumed under the summary appellation of “internal improvements”. These included transportation—roads and canals and later railroads—and schools, including common schools and state universities. The Land Ordinance of 1785, whichprovided for surveying the public domain into 6-mile-square townships, reserved a one-square-mile section in each township for the support of the common schools. States admitted to the union after 1800 received grants of land to support state universities and other state services.

Towns and counties continued to provide basic social welfare services, support for the dependent poor, increasingly in small institutions such as almshouses and poor farms. But the campaigns of Dorthea Dix, a noted reformer, and others for expanded state services, usually institutional care for specific categories of poor people—the insane, the retarded, children, and criminals—increased the power and prominence of state government in the provision of social welfare services. Indeed, as social welfare provision became more specialized, more targeted upon persons with identifiable physical, emotional, or cognitive impairments, states began to expand their social welfare activities. Although county and town services continued to be important as a first line of defense for the “undifferentiated poor”, some state leaders argued the superiority of state services as opposed to the backward, often patronage-ridden town or county services.

The Civil War and After

A half century of agitation for a more liberal land policy culminated in the successful passage of four “western measures”—the Homestead Act, the Morrill Land Grant College Act, the Department of Agriculture Act, and the Pacific Railroad Act—by the first Civil War Congress in 1862. The four measures determined to an extent unforeseen in 1862 the subsequent development of the western United States. Between 1863 and 1912, the federal government distributed over 239 million acres of free land to homesteaders （although settlers claimed final title to only 150 million acres）. In addition, the states received nearly 100 million acres in land grants for agricultural and mechanical colleges and railroad companies received nearly 350 million acres. The four western measures were the culmination of an increasingly liberal land policy and embodied a social investment approach to the development of the western United States. The federal government distributed assets in the form of land to settlers and invested in research, education, and a transportation infrastructure through direct appropriations and land grants to states and railroads. The four laws, as modified by subsequent legislation, were to provide the basic structure for the development of the western United States.

Also in 1862, Congress passed the Pension Act, providing pensions for disabled soldiers and the survivors of deceased soldiers. Initially designed as an aid to Union Army recruitment,Congress repeatedly liberalized the provisions of the pension system. By the early twentieth century, the American Civil War pension system rivaled European old-age pension programs in coverage and generosity. By 1910, more than one fourth of men over the age of 65 received Civil War pensions.

States began to centralize social welfare and correctional services during the late nineteenth century. Following Massachusetts’ lead in 1863, many states created boards of charities and correction to organize state institutions on a businesslike basis. State social welfare provision expanded as state boards examined outcomes of institutionalization. Specialized mental health services, correctional services, and a variety of other institutional services were provided under state auspice, rather than by towns or counties. The view that services administered by state governments were believed to be less patronage-ridden and corrupt than local government services was even more widely accepted after the Civil War. The widely imitated New York State Care Act of 1890 gave the state responsibility for providing care to all of the insane poor. In some states, commissioners visited township and county institutions and recommended improvements in local programs. Wisconsin went further, mandating that counties provide care for chronically mentally ill residents in county institutions. In 1869, Congress created a Board of Indian Commissioners, similar to the state boards of charity, to oversee federal Indian programs.

By the twentieth century, the United States had become an urban nation. Urban population, only a quarter of the total in 1880, increased to 40 percent in 1900 and to half of the population in 1920. Rural areas began to be seen as problem areas. In comparison to cities, rural areas had fewer specialized services and less economic opportunity. Following European precedent, in 1908 President Theodore Roosevelt organized a Country Life Commission, which celebrated rural life, but criticized farmers’ excessive individualism. It called for the development of cooperative enterprises and focused attention on the problems of farm wives and the difficulty of keeping children on the farm. Toward the end of his term, Roosevelt called social workers and child welfare workers to Washington for the first White House Conference on Dependent Children, which met in 1909. Family life rather than institutional care for children should be supported, the conference attendees declared. The conference also called for the establishment of a federal Children’s Bureau, which Congress created in 1912.

A major agenda of the Progressive Era was the expansion of state regulation and state social welfare services. Social workers campaigned for state social welfare measures, inparticular for the children’s codes, and expanded their scope to include mothers’ pensions and juvenile courts as well as child labor restrictions and compulsory school attendance laws. Quite often, however, the reforms were limited to urban areas. For example, Missouri’s Mothers’ Pension Law, the first in the nation, applied only to St. Louis and Kansas City when it was enacted in 1911. （The Illinois law, however, enacted a few months later, applied to all sections of the state.） State social welfare legislation had the potential to influence rural areas by establishing standards for children and families, but often it was only a potential. Problems of funding, inadequate resources, and rural resistance frustrated reformers.

World War, Prosperity, and Depression

During World War I, the American Red Cross organized the Home Service, a national social service program. Red Cross workers attempted to link servicemen, many of whom were away from home for the first time, with their families on the home front. For the first time, social workers attempted to organize services in rural areas as well as in cities. The U.S. Children’s Bureau, created to “investigate and report on all matters pertaining to the welfare of children”, focused on investigations of infant mortality during the 1910s. The U.S. infant mortality rate, the bureau found, was higher than in any other industrial country. High rates of infant mortality prevailed in the rural South and in slum areas of big cities. In 1921, Congress passed the Sheppard-Towner Act, which provided federal funds to the states for health and welfare services. Although physicians who feared socialized medicine criticized the act, it proved to be popular with the states, which initiated new child health programs with the federal money.

For social welfare administrators, public welfare seemed to have come of age during the 1920s. All of the states adopted workmen’s compensation programs. The Sheppard-Towner Act provided the first direct federal funding for state social welfare services and stimulated the development of such programs. The children’s code movement succeeded in state after state, and state child welfare laws extended social services into the rural areas of even the most backward states. States from Alabama to Minnesota established county child welfare boards to enforce child labor and school attendance laws, to establish juvenile courts and juvenile probation services, and to provide support to dependent children. By 1935, all but two states had enacted mothers’ pension laws and smaller numbers of states had pension programs for the blind and elderly poor.

The Great Depression of the 1930s, which resulted in business failures, drastic declines in stock prices, and high unemployment, threatened to stall the growth of welfare programs.Congress ended the controversial Sheppard-Towner program in 1929. Increasing need, however, led Congress to enact the Emergency Relief and Construction Act in 1932, authorizing the Herbert Hoover administration to loan funds to the states for unemployment relief. The new administration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt went further. Upon taking office, Roosevelt called for an emergency relief act, providing grants, not loans, to the states for unemployment relief. In response, Congress enacted the Federal Emergency Relief Act in 1933. A plethora of other relief acts followed. In 1935, a new era in social welfare began with the Social Security Act, which provided a federal old-age insurance program and federally assisted and regulated state programs of unemployment insurance, public assistance for dependent children, the aged, and the blind, and social services. Henceforth, it seemed that the federal government would be at the forefront of social welfare in the United States.

The history of social welfare since the 1935 Social Security Act divides into two distinct periods. The first period, from 1935 to 1968, expanded social welfare; the second, 1969 to the present, has contracted it. In each period, political and economic factors combined with powerful social movements to foster expansion or contraction.

Expansion: 1935–1968

The Great Depression of the 1930s spurred the expansion of the first era. In the wake of the 1929 stock market collapse, the unemployment rate reached 25 percent in 1933, and the economy shrank to half its former size. The magnitude of this crisis overwhelmed private charities and demonstrated the inadequacy of measures like the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, which, beginning in 1933, had distributed grants to the states. When the Democrats swamped the Republicans in the 1934 congressional elections, their victory closed the “first New Deal” and set the stage for more decisive action.

This decisive action crystallized in the form of an omnibus Social Security Act. Enacted in 1935, the Social Security Act incorporated social welfare provisions that social movements had long demanded.

Although the Social Security Act created the foundation for the modern American welfare state, the strength of the “Solid South” within the Democratic Party severely limited its scope and progressivism. With southerners occupying the chairmanships of many key congressional committees, the legislation bowed to states’ rights. Its retirement program barred domestic and agricultural laborers—African American maids and plantation workers in the South. To ensurethat welfare payments did not rise above their low wages, the states set minimal need and benefits levels for public assistance and got considerable latitude to design the eligibility requirements for their own unemployment programs. Social Security also excluded health insurance and funded the retirement program out of a tax on payroll rather than a progressive tax on all income. Most important, however, the legislation handed future generations of reformers a two-track legacy. One track drew on an earned benefit to offer a social insurance program that, over time, would expand to include unstigmatized and nearly universal coverage. The other track, public assistance, gave stigmatized aid to the “unworthy poor”—women and children who, either alone or through their husbands, had insufficient contact with the labor market. Into the early twenty-first century, public assistance, and the food, housing, and health care programs with which it was associated, would prove much more vulnerable to retrenchment.

Other New Deal social welfare legislation accompanied the Social Security Act. Work relief programs like the Civilian Conservation Corps and the Work Projects Administration stimulated the economy by hiring the unemployed to prevent soil erosion, construct public facilities, and initiate cultural projects like collecting oral histories from former slaves. In 1937, the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration also enacted the first housing law that provided federal funds for housing projects. As with so much other New Deal legislation, however, this act deferred to private interests by insisting on the destruction of one unit of housing for every new unit that was built.

Yet, despite these social welfare measures and the first deliberate deficit spending to stimulate the economy, the Depression lingered on. After declining to 14 percent in 1935, unemployment climbed again to 18 percent in 1937. It only declined after that with the preparations for World War II. The war brought the unemployment rate down to one percent by 1944. In addition to reducing unemployment, World War II also subtly altered gender and race relations. Gender relations were altered because with so many men in the military, a shortage of male workers obligated Congress to reconsider its opposition to the provision of day care. The result was the Lanham Act of 1941 that enabled thousands of “Rosie the Riveters” to get jobs in factories. Although Congress ended its funding immediately after the war, the act demonstrated the potential of comprehensive day care and firmly implanted an image of female resourcefulness and independence in the public’s mind.

The victory of the United States in World War II precipitated a great debate about the continuation of New Deal social policies. Uneasy in the knowledge that only rearmament hadended the Great Depression, many progressives worried that demobilization of the military would return the unemployment rate to depression levels. This concern led them to push for passage of the Full Employment Act of 1946, which would have created an employment planning mechanism within the federal government. When conservatives and the business community mobilized successfully to prevent such an expansion of the federal government’s economic role, the act lost its enforcement powers, and post-World War II social welfare policy followed a different trajectory. Now, instead of significant new policy initiatives, social welfare moved slowly forward under the banner of cold war liberalism.

The rise of McCarthyism and the arms race with the Soviet Union dictated the pace of social welfare reform. Although Senator Joseph McCarthy, a Republican from Wisconsin, began his political ascendancy by focusing on “communists” in the State Department, scrutiny soon spread throughout American society to anyone who advocated significant social reforms. With the arms race siphoning off money for domestic needs, policymakers had neither the inclination nor the resources to address many pressing domestic issues. The federal government did fund hospital construction under the Hill-Burton Act of 1946, urban renewal and suburban development through the Housing Reform Act of 1949, and disability insurance through an expanded Social Security Act in 1956. For the most part, however, social welfare policy in the immediate postwar era lacked the boldness that marked the height of the New Deal.

Despite Kennedy’s reputation for dynamism, he adopted a cautious approach to civil rights and most other social welfare issues. Pressed by trade unions concerned about the effects of automation, he signed the 1962 Manpower Development Act, the first real job training initiative since the New Deal. In the same year, Kennedy also pushed for an amendment to the Social Security Act that expanded the federal government’s authority to reimburse the states for social services.

Yet it was only his assassination 3 months later that paved the way for the passage of the bill. In a legislative wave unmatched since the New Deal, a spate of other social welfare measures soon followed. This Great Society legislation included the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Older Americans Act of 1965, Medicaid and Medicare （1965）, as well as a number of programs launched under the auspices of the Office of Economic Opportunity as part of the War on Poverty.

Retrenchment: 1969 to the Present

In fact, these programs did not last very long because their targeting of racial minorities quickly produced a racial backlash. Defining this group of Whites as the “silent majority”, Richard M. Nixon won a narrow plurality in the 1968 presidential election. Although his administration continued to expand social welfare, the Nixon presidency marked the end of the New Deal. To be sure, he proposed a Family Assistance Plan, which, while it failed to pass Congress, was the closest the United States has ever come to a guaranteed income; consolidated the states’ programs for aged, blind, and disabled into Supplemental Security Income （SSI, 1972）; increased Social Security by 20 percent and indexed it to inflation （1973）; and enacted the Comprehensive Employment Training Act （1973）, the largest job training program since the Great Depression. By centralizing power within the federal government, however, he put the brakes on the diffusion of social welfare. For the next three decades, justifications of social welfare would depend on their use for conservative ends.

Social welfare retrenchment began in earnest during the administration of President Jimmy Carter, who cut housing subsidies and restrained spending. When Carter’s cutbacks angered liberal Democrats, without addressing the concerns of the Republican Party’s conservative wing, Ronald Reagan, the governor of California and a true tribune of the conservative movement, swept into power. Defining government social programs as the problem rather than a solution, Reagan slashed social services, cut the housing budget by three-quarters, tightened work requirements for welfare recipients, and pushed nearly a half million people off the disability rolls. Moreover, as federal spending shifted into the military and an arms race with the Soviet Union, the skyrocketing budget deficit further lowered the ceiling on domestic spending and made it harder to propose new social policy initiatives.

By the end of the Reagan administration, the conservative critique of social welfare pervaded the public’s consciousness. Social welfare was, by definition, for other people—the poor, persons of color, and women who refused to stop having babies. Such a definition underlay further cutbacks like the first major welfare reform, the Family Support Act of 1988, which, in exchange for one year of transitional day care and health coverage, demanded that any mother with a child more than 3 years old find work or register in a work training program.

President George H. W. Bush’s focus on international affairs created a domestic policy vacuum that Bill Clinton （1993–2001）, the first Democratic president in 12 years, rushed to fill. Against the opposition of Republicans wary of any federal intervention in the job market, the Clinton administration did pass a law providing for unpaid family medical leave. Butotherwise, Clinton’s policy model relied on the private sector to effect most of his social reforms. Conservatives succeeded in blocking his 1993–1994 health care initiatives, because no existing social movement pushed for a proposal in which the government would only supplement the health care funded by a rationalized health insurance industry. Likewise, after campaigning for an “end to welfare as we know it”, Clinton yielded in 1996 to the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, a more conservative bill that lacked the social supports the administration desired, but ended the entitlement to public assistance, limited its lifetime receipt to 5 years, and required most welfare recipients to get a job within 2 years. In employment training, too, Congress enacted and Clinton signed the 1998 Workforce Investment Act, which defined clients as “customers” and demanded “work first” before offering services. Although these efforts to harness the private sector for the goal of policy reform did make social welfare more marketlike, some policy analysts criticized them as disguised retrenchments—a market solution for poor people who had already lost out in a market economy.

Elected on the promise of compassionate conservatism, President George W. Bush has combined proposals for a market-based approach with a renewed emphasis on direct cutbacks in social welfare spending. His proposals for direct cutbacks include extending the workfare requirements from 30 to 40 hours a week and tightening eligibility for public housing. But he also proposed privatization of Social Security and the provision of a drug prescription benefit on the condition that the elderly leave Medicare for a private insurance plan. Enactment of these proposals would further dramatize the difference between the New Deal and the Great Society’s expansion of social welfare and the contraction that has occurred under the increasingly conservative policies that have dominated for the last three decades.

Central to the history of the American social welfare state is passage of the 1935 Social Security Act, which created two social insurance programs （federal Old Age Insurance and federal-state Unemployment Insurance）, three federal-state public assistance programs （Old Age Assistance, Aid to the Blind, and Aid to Dependent Children）, as well as grants to states for five social service and health programs （child welfare, crippled children’s programs, maternal and child health, public health work, and vocational rehabilitation）. By the end of the twentieth century, social insurance and public assistance programs had expanded to touch the lives of most Americans, transforming social welfare provision since the days of the GreatDepression and providing an unprecedented level of economic security for the country’s aged. In the six and a half decades since the original act, a once highly limited old-age social insurance system grew to include survivor benefits （added in 1939）, disability insurance（1956）, and health insurance for the aged （Medicare, 1965）. Automatic cost-of-living benefits increases were added （1972） and a vast broadening of employee coverage had taken place. The inflow of payroll taxes used to finance social insurance had become huge, being the second-largest source of federal revenues （larger than corporate income tax receipts but smaller than individual income tax revenues）. The size of this revenue stream and the projected outflow of benefits established Social Security as a crucial feature of national budget debates.

In 1935, the phrase “social security” was used for both social insurance and public assistance programs. They were seen as complementary parts of a unified whole. In this view, social insurance was to be dominant, and public assistance was to perform a supportive, and, it was hoped, temporary, role—withering away, for the most part, as social insurance matured. Over time, however, and in large part through the efforts of Social Security leaders, the phrase“social security” has come to mean only the social insurance programs.

The changing meaning of the phrase, “social security”, was part of an evolving system of social security ideology that emphasized differentiating social insurance from public assistance. This ideology has played an important role in legitimating social insurance, in terms of the argument that social insurance has a unique congruence with American values and public assistance does not. It has characterized American social insurance as （1） contributory and with earned benefits: Workers and employers pay earmarked payroll taxes to finance the system; （2） wage-related: an individual’s level of benefits is tied, within limits, to prior earnings level, thus rewarding work; and （3） universal: poor and nonpoor alike participate with no means testing and with benefits going to the wealthy as well as the poor. This contrasts with welfare, which is characterized as （1） not contributory and thus unearned because it is financed through general revenues; （2） not wage-related and thus out of step with the work ethic: Benefits are not conditional on the recipient’s participation in the workforce; and （3） selective: welfare targets the poor, splitting them away from a politically powerful alliance with the nonpoor as found in social insurance. In the early years, these conceptualizations were expressed in a frequently used private insurance metaphor. Social Security benefits were explicitly compared to private insurance policies. Payroll taxes were said to be not taxes but“premiums” on a social security “policy” held by workers and the resulting benefits hadconnotations of private property. This was contrasted with the “charity” quality of public assistance and its association with dependency. Over the years, the use of explicit private insurance imagery has moderated and although social insurance terminology is still in use, few today would compare Social Security to a private insurance policy or deny that payroll deductions are taxes as was done in the early days.

A challenge for contemporary Social Security is how to finance future benefits—a problem that has been emerging since the late 1970s and is now full-blown. The original retirement system was highly conservative, designed to operate on a full reserve basis. Projected benefits could not exceed actual payroll taxes on hand. This proved to be a political liability because it meant benefit levels then had to be so low as to be unresponsive to the actual needs of the elderly. In the 1939 amendments, the full reserve model was abandoned, and the system has been on a modified reserve basis since. Benefit levels have been limited not by funds on hand but by projections of future funding. At the time, Social Security staff predicted the 1939 abandonment of full reserves meant, over the long run, payroll taxes alone would be insufficient to finance benefits and that eventually （some predicted by the 1990s） additional sources of revenues from general taxation would have to be used. That long-ago prediction now resonates with the contemporary funding challenge facing Social Security. With the imminent retirement of the large baby-boom generation, the current payroll tax structure cannot sustain benefit levels in either the retirement or Medicare program over the coming decades. Policy leaders and Congress are faced with difficult choices to resolve the problem and options under consideration include cutting benefits, postponing retirement age, raising payroll taxes, using general revenues, and privatizing portions of Social Security.

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4. Concord Coalition协和联盟，是关注美国政府赤字危机、促进联邦政府财政预算平衡的跨党派组织。

I. Fill in the blanks according to the text.

1. _____________ dialect is the nation’s “standard”; hence, it is the accent most widely used in national media.

2. Religiously, the Southeast is overwhelmingly Baptist, whereas the upper Mid-west is primarily _______________.

3. Americans favor individuals working their own way up rather than getting _____________.

4. All people in the United States have the basic freedoms and protections outlined in the founding documents, __________________ and _____________________.

5. Americans delay marriage, seek divorces, and remarry because they expect marriage to be____________, ____________, and ___________________.

6. Americans of all backgrounds expect seniors, after spending most of a lifetime working, to be able to retire with _____________and economic ______________.

7. When people are faced with threats to their ability to earn a living, Americans favor government intervention—including intervention to _____________, _________________, and ______________.

8. _______________, affirmed by the colonial legislatures, made poor relief a local responsibility.

9. A half century of agitation for a more liberal land policy culminated in the successful passage of four “western measures”—__________________, _____________________,_______________, and ________________—by the first Civil War Congress in 1862.

10. Although __________________ created the foundation for the modern American welfare state, the strength of the “Solid South” within the Democratic Party severely limited its scope and progressivism.