一、案例名称（Case Name）；例如：Marbury v. Madison（马伯里诉麦迪逊）, v is short for versus.是“诉”的意思。
二、判决法院（Court rendering the opinion）；例如：New Jersey Supreme Court(新泽西最高法院)。
三、卷宗号；案号（Citation）；例如：93 N.J324, 461 A. 2d 138(1983)，这说明该案出自《新西汇编》第93卷，第324页，以及《大西洋汇编》第二辑第138页，该案判决于1983年。此处，A 是Atlantic Reporter的缩写。像这种指明两个或两个以上出处的卷宗号叫作：“平行卷宗号”，其英语表达为“parallel citation”，意思是“An additional reference to a case that has been reported in more than more reporter.”广义上卷宗号包括上述一、案例名称；二、判决法院。
四、主审法官姓名（Justice wrote the opinion）。
五、判决书（opinion: stating the issue raised, describing the parties and facts, discussing the relevant law, and rendering judgment.）。判决书是整个案例的主体部分，其中包括法律争议（Issue）、双方当事人情况、事实经过、判决采用的相关法律以及判决结果。
判决书的阅读过程之中，要注意以下几点：1．时态主审法官的意见用现在时态；前审法院的意见用过去时态。2．主审法官的意见是法院意见。3．除法院意见外还有两种意见，它们被称为“反对意见”（dissenting opinion or dissent）与“配合意见”（concurring opinion）。Dissenting opinion: opinion offered by a judge disagreeing with the majority panel of judges conclusion; “反对意见”指不同意大多数法官判决结论之某一法官的意见；Concurring opinion: opinion written by a judge agreeing with the majority's conclusion but not its reasoning. “配合意见”是指同意大多数法官的意见，但是不同意判决结论的推理之某一法官的意见。
六、法庭投票（Votes of the court）。例如在七名大法官审理的情况下，有几名法官的意见是“维持原判”（affirmance），有几名法官的意见是“撤销原判、发回重审”（reversal and remandment）。
第二部分
一、什么是citation?
由于卷宗号这一块涉及内容庞杂，这里再逐一特别说明一下。我们首先来看一下《布莱克法律词典》中citation的定义：A reference to a legal precedent or authority, such as a case, statute, or treatise, that either substantiates or contradicts a given position. (p.237) 7th edition. 由于a citation is a reference to a legal authority，因此，citation必须要有一个标准，这样以后的参考者才容易检索的到。正如《布莱克法律词典》所指出的一样，Citation formats exist for many different types of legal sources including cases, statutes and secondary legal materials. Understanding the basic format for each of these different types of sources will enable the researcher to more independently locate materials in the law library.
案例之中的卷宗号通常包括下列几个部分：
a．案件双方当事人姓名（the names of the parties involved in the lawsuit）；
b．包含案件全文的汇编卷号（the volume number of the reporter containing the full text of the case）；
c．该案例汇编的缩写名称（the abbreviated name of that case reporter）；
d．案例开始的页码数（the page number on which the case begins）；
e．案件判决年份（the year the case was decided）；有时还包括
f．案件判决法院（the name of the court deciding the case）。
举例说明: Hebb v.Severson, 201 P.2d 156 (Wash.1948). 在这个例子当中，Hebb是原告（plaintiff），Severson 是被告（defendant）。 我们可以在《太平洋汇编》第二辑201卷的第156页（volume 201 of the Pacific Reporter Second Series beginning on page 156）找到这一案例。该案是由华盛顿州最高法院（Washington State Supreme Court）于1948年判决的。
U.S. Supreme Court Decisions, Lawyers Edition, 2d Series
美国最高法院案例汇编，律师版第二辑
N.E.
Northeastern Reporter
东北汇编
N.E.2d.
Northeastern Reporter, 2d Series
东北汇编第二辑
N.W.
Northwestern Reporter
西北汇编
N.W.2d.
Northwestern Reporter, 2d Series
西北汇编第二辑
N.Y.S.
New York Supplement
纽约补充案例
N.Y. S.2d.
New York Supplement, 2d Series
纽约补充案例，第二辑
P.
Pacific Reporter
太平洋汇编
P.2d.
Pacific Reporter, 2d Series
太平洋汇编，第二辑
S.Ct.
Supreme Court Reporter
最高法院案例汇编
S.E.
Southeastern Reporter
东南汇编
S.E.2d.
Southeastern Reporter, 2d Series
东南汇编，第二辑
So.
Southern Reporter
南方汇编
So.2d.
Southern Reporter, 2d Series
南方汇编，第二辑
S.W.
Southwestern Reporter
西南汇编
S.W.2d.
Southwestern Reporter, 2d Series
西南汇编，第二辑
U.S.
United States Reports
美国案例汇编
再举两例说明：Morgan v.United States, 298 U.S.468, 56 S.Ct 906, 80L.Ed. 1288（1936）表示：摩根诉美国，收集在美国案例汇编第298卷，第468页开始；最高法院案例汇编第56卷第906页开始；美国最高法院案例汇编律师版第80卷，第1288页开始，1936年判决。 For example, a popular name for a Supreme Court case is:
Roe
v.
Wade
Which translates as
Plaintiff
versus
Defendant
原告 罗
诉
被告魏德
The official citation for this Supreme Court decision is:
410
U.S.
113
Which translates as
Volume 410
United Stated Reports
Page 113
410卷
美国案例汇编
113页
There are several different publishers for legal documents such as court decisions. (Libraries usually only carry one of these published versions.) These publishers may be referred to in parallel citations for this case.
例如，该案的平行汇编是：
93
S. Ct.
705
Which translates as
Volume 93
Supreme Court Reporter
Page 705
第93卷
最高法院案例汇编
705页
Or
35
L. Ed. 2d
147
Which translates as
Volume 35
U.S. Supreme Court Reports, Lawyers Edition, 2nd Series
U.S.Supreme Court MARBURY v. MADISON, 5 U.S.137 (1803)(1) 5 U.S.137 (Cranch) WILLIAM MARBURY v. JAMES MADISON, Secretary of State of the United States. February Term, 1803
Chief Justice John Marshall delivered the opinion(2) of the Court....
In the order in which the court has viewed this subject, the following questions have been considered and decided.
1. Has the applicant(3) a right to the commission he demands?
2. If he has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws of his country afford him a remedy?
3. If they do afford him a remedy, is it a mandamus issuing from this court?
The first object of inquiry is,
1. Has the applicant a right to the commission he demands? ...
His right originates in an act(4) of congress passed in February 1801, concerning the district of Columbia....
In order to determine whether he is entitled to this commission, it becomes necessary to inquire whether he has been appointed to the office....
It is therefore decidedly the opinion of the court, that when a commission has been signed by the president, the appointment is made; and that the commission is complete when the seal of the United States has been affixed to it by the secretary of state....
Mr.Marbury, then, since his commission was signed by the president, and sealed by the secretary of state, was appointed; and as the law creating the office gave the officer a right to hold for five years independent of the executive, the appointment was not revocable(5); but vested in the officer legal rights which are protected by the laws of his country.
To withhold(6)the commission, therefore, is an act deemed by the court not warranted by law, but violative of a vested legal right.
This brings us to the second inquiry; which is,
2. If he has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws of his country afford him a remedy? The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection....
The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.
If this obloquy is to be cast on the jurisprudence(7) of our country, it must arise from the peculiar character of the case.
It behoves us then to inquire whether there be in its composition any ingredient which shall exempt from legal investigation, or exclude the injured party from legal redress. ...
But when the legislature(8) proceeds to impose on that officer other duties; when he is directed peremptorily to perform certain acts; when the rights of individuals are dependent on the performance of those acts; he is so far the officer of the law; is amenable to the laws for his conduct; and cannot at his discretion sport away the vested rights of others.
The conclusion from this reasoning is, that where the heads of departments are the political or confidential agents of the executive, merely to execute the will of the president, or rather to act in cases in which the executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion(9), nothing can be more perfectly clear than that their acts are only politically examinable. But where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, it seems equally clear that the individual who considers himself injured has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy....
It is then the opinion of the Court,
1. That by signing the commission of Mr.Marbury, the president of the United States appointed him a justice of peace for the county of Washington in the district of Columbia; and that the seal of the United States, affixed thereto by the secretary of state, is conclusive testimony of the verity of the signature, and of the completion of the appointment; and that the appointment conferred on him a legal right to the office for the space of five years.
2. That, having this legal title to the office, he has a consequent right to the commission; a refusal to deliver which is a plain violation of that right, for which the laws of his country afford him a remedy.
It remains to be inquired whether,
3. He is entitled to the remedy for which he applies. This depends on,
(A) The nature of the writ applied for.
(B) The power of this court.
1. The nature of the writ....
This writ, if awarded, would be directed to an officer of government, and its mandate to him would be ... “to do a particular thing therein specified, which appertains to his office and duty, and which the court has previously determined or at least supposes to be consonant to right and justice ... ”
These circumstances certainly concur in this case....
This, then, is a plain case of a mandamus, either to deliver the commission, or a copy of it from the record; and it only remains to be inquired, Whether it can issue from this court.
The act(10) to establish the judicial courts of the United States authorizes the supreme court “to issue writs of mandamus, in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States.”
The secretary of state, being a person, holding an office under the authority of the United States, is precisely within the letter of the description; and if this court is not authorized to issue a writ of mandamus to such an officer, it must be because the law is unconstitutional, and therefore absolutely incapable of conferring the authority, and assigning the duties which its words purport to confer and assign.
The constitution vests the whole judicial power(11) of the United States in one supreme court, and such inferior courts(12) as congress shall, from time to time, ordain(13)and establish. This power is expressly extended to all cases arising under the laws of the United States; and consequently, in some form, may be exercised over the present case; because the right claimed is given by a law of the United States.
In the distribution of this power it is declared that “the supreme court shall have original jurisdiction(14) in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all other cases, the supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction.”
It has been insisted at the bar, that as the original grant of jurisdiction to the supreme and inferior courts is general, and the clause, assigning original jurisdiction to the supreme court, contains no negative or restrictive words; the power remains to the legislature to assign original jurisdiction to that court in other cases than those specified in the article which has been recited; provided those cases belong to the judicial power of the United States.
If it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the legislature to apportion the judicial power between the supreme and inferior courts according to the will of that body, it would certainly have been useless to have proceeded further than to have defined the judicial power, and the tribunals(15) in which it should be vested.... If congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction, where the constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original and original jurisdiction where the constitution has declared it shall be appellate; the distribution of jurisdiction, made in the constitution, is form without substance....
To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction.
It has been stated at the bar(16) that the appellate jurisdiction may be exercised in a variety of forms, and that if it be the will of the legislature that a mandamus should be used for that purpose, that will must be obeyed. This is true; yet the jurisdiction must be appellate, not original.
It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction, that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that cause(17)....
The authority, therefore, given to the supreme court, by the act establishing the judicial courts of the United States, to issue writs of mandamus to public officers, appears not to be warranted by the constitution, and it becomes necessary to inquire whether a jurisdiction, so conferred, can be exercised....
The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken or forgotten, the constitution is written. To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing; if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained? The distinction between a government with limited and unlimited powers is abolished, if those limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts allowed are of equal obligation. It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it; or, that the legislature may alter the constitution by an ordinary act.
Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. The constitution is either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.
If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary to the constitution is not law: if the latter part be true, then written constitutions are absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power in its own nature illimitable.
Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void.
This theory is essentially attached to a written constitution, and is, consequently, to be considered, by this court, as one of the fundamental principles of our society. It is not therefore to be lost sight of in the further consideration of this subject.
If an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void, does it, notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the courts, and oblige them to give it effect? Or, in other words, though it be not law, does it constitute a rule as operative as if it was a law? This would be to overthrow in fact what was established in theory; and would seem, at first view, an absurdity too gross to be insisted on. It shall, however, receive a more attentive consideration.
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other the courts must decide on the operation of each. So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty....
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions(18), that a law repugnant to the constitution is void, and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.
The rule must be discharged.
Questions to Consider:
1. If the Supreme Court of the United States had issued the writ of mandamus, how could it have forced Madison to comply with the order? What would have happened if he had ignored it? (In other words, does the Court have enforcement power?)
2. In the Court's opinion, is Marbury entitled to his appointment?
3. According to the decision, does the Supreme Court of the United States have the authority to issue a writ of mandamus to force Madison to deliver the commission? Explain. Is there any way to reverse the Court's decision?
4. In this case, Chief Justice John Marshall and the Court “gave up some power in order to get more.” Explain. What power did they give up? What power did they gain? Why did the Court do this?
5. Why does the judicial branch, as opposed to the executive or legislative branch, have the power of judicial review?
6. What do you think the doctrine of constitutional supremacy?
7. Imagine that Jefferson, rather than Adams, had appointed the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Would the outcome of this case, and the future of the country, have been different? Why?
Central London Property Trust Limited v. High Trees House Limited [1947] K.B.(21) 130
ACTION tried by Denning J.
By a lease under seal(22) made on September 24, 1937, the plaintiffs, Central London Property Trust Ld., granted to the defendants, High Trees House Ld., a subsidiary(23) of the plaintiff company, a tenancy of a block of flats for the term of ninetynine years from September 29, 1937, at a ground rent of ￡2,500. a year. The block of flats was a new one and had not been fully occupied at the beginning of the war owing to the absence of people from London. With war conditions prevailing, it was apparent to those responsible that the rent reserved under the lease could not be paid out of the profits of the flats and, accordingly, discussions took place between the directors of the two companies concerned, which were closely associated, and an arrangement was made between them which was put into writing. On January 3,1940, the plaintiffs wrote to the defendants in these terms, “we confirm the arrangement made between us by which the ground rent should be reduced as from the commencement of the lease to ￡1,250. per annum,” and on April 2, 1940, a confirmatory resolution to the same effect was passed by the plaintiff company. On March 20, 1941, a receiver(24) was appointed by the debenture(25) holders of the plaintiffs and on his death on February 28, 1944, his place was taken by his partner. The defendants paid the reduced rent from 1941 down to the beginning of 1945 by which time all the flats in the block were fully let, and continued to pay it thereafter. In September, 1945, the then receiver of the plaintiff company looked into the matter of the lease and ascertained that the rent actually reserved by it was ￡2,500.On September 21, 1945, he wrote to the defendants saying that rent must be paid at the full rate and claiming that arrears amounting to ￡7,916 were due. Subsequently, he instituted the present friendly proceedings(26) to test the legal position in regard to the rate at which rent was payable. In the action the plaintiffs sought to recover ￡625, being the amount represented by the difference between rent at the rate of ￡2, 500. and ￡1,250. per annum for the quarters ending September 29, and December 25, 1945. By their defence the defendants pleaded (1.) that the letter of January 3, 1940, constituted an agreement that the rent reserved should be 1,250l. only, and that such agreement related to the whole term of the lease, (2.) they pleaded in the alternative(27) that the plaintiff company were estopped from alleging that the rent exceeded 1,250l. per annum and (3.) as a further alternative, that by failing to demand rent in excess of 1,250l. before their letter of September 21, 1945 (received by the defendants on September 24), they had waived their rights in respect of any rent, in excess of that at the rate of ￡1,250., which had accrued up to September 24, 1945.
DENNING J.stated the facts and continued:
If I were to consider this matter without regard to recent developments in the law, there is no doubt that had the plaintiffs claimed it, they would have been entitled to recover ground rent at the rate of 2,500l. a year from the beginning of the term, since the lease under which it was payable was a lease under seal which, according to the old common law, could not be varied by an agreement by parol (whether in writing or not)(28), but only by deed(29). Equity(30), however stepped in, and said that if there has been a variation of a deed by a simple contract(31) (which in the case of a lease required to be in writing would have to be evidenced by writing)(32), the courts may give effect to it as is shown in Berry v. Berry [1929] 2 K.B.316. That equitable doctrine, however, could hardly apply in the present case because the variation here might be said to have been made without consideration(33). With regard to estoppel, the representation made in relation to reducing the rent, was not a representation of an existing fact. It was a representation, in effect, as to the future, namely, that payment of the rent would not be enforced at the full rate but only at the reduced rate. Such a representation would not give rise to an estoppel, because, as was said in Jorden v. Money (1854) 5 H.L.C.185(34), a representation as to the future must be embodied as a contract or be nothing(35). But what is the position in view of developments in the law in recent years? The law has not been standing still since Jorden v. Money (1854) 5 H.L.C.185. There has been a series of decisions over the last fifty years which, although they are said to be cases of estoppel are not really such. They are cases in which a promise was made which was intended to create legal relations and which, to the knowledge of the person making the promise, was going to be acted on by the person to whom it was made and which was in fact so acted on. In such cases the courts have said that the promise must be honored(36). The cases to which I particularly desire to refer are: Fenner v. Blake [1900] 1
Q.B.426, In re Wickham (1917) 34 T.L.R.158, Re William Porter & Co., Ld. [1937] 2 All E. R. 361 and Buttery v. Pickard [1946] W. N. 25. As I have said they are not cases of estoppel in the strict sense.(37) They are really promises-promises intended to be binding, intended to be acted on, and in fact acted on. Jorden v. Money (1854) 5 H. L. C. 185 can be distinguished(38), because there the promisor made it clear that she did not intend to be legally bound, whereas in the cases to which I refer the proper inference was that the promisor did intend to be bound. In each case the court held the promise to be binding on the party making it, even though under the old common law(39) it might be difficult to find any consideration for it. The courts have not gone so far as to give a cause of action in damages for the breach of such a promise, but they have refused to allow the party making it to act inconsistently with it. It is in that sense, and that sense only, that such a promise gives rise to an estoppel. The decisions are a natural result of the fusion of law(40)20 and equity: for the cases of Hughes v.Metropolitan Ry. Co.(1877) 2 App. Cas. 439, 448, Birmingham and District Land Co.v.London & North Western Ry.Co. (1888) 40 Ch.D.268, 286 and Salisbury (Marquess) v. Gilmore [1942] 2 K.B.38, 51, afford a sufficient basis for saying that a party would not be allowed in equity to go back on such a promise. In my opinion, the time has now come for the validity of such a promise to be recognized. The logical consequence, no doubt is that a promise to accept a smaller sum in discharge of a larger sum, if acted upon, is binding notwithstanding the absence of consideration: and if the fusion of law and equity leads to this result, so much the better(41). That aspect was not considered in Foakes v.Beer (1884) 9 App.Cas.605. At this time of day however, when law and equity have been joined together for over seventy years, principles must be reconsidered in the light of their combined effect. It is to be noticed that in the Sixth Interim Report of the Law Revision Committee, pars. 35, 40, it is recommended that such a promise as that to which I have referred, should be enforceable in law even though no consideration for it has been given by the promisee. It seems to me that, to the extent I have mentioned that result has now been achieved by the decisions of the courts. I am satisfied that a promise such as that to which I have referred is binding and the only question remaining for my consideration is the scope of the promise in the present case. I am satisfied on all the evidence that the promise here was that the ground rent should be reduced to 1,250l. a year as a temporary expedient while the block of flats was not fully, or substantially fully let, owing to the conditions prevailing. That means that the reduction in the rent applied throughout the years down to the end of 1944, but early in 1945 it is plain that the flats were fully let, and, indeed the rents received from them (many of them not being affected by the Rent Restrictions Acts(42)), were increased beyond the figure at which it was originally contemplated that they would be let. At all events the rent from them must have been very considerable. I find that the conditions prevailing at the time when the reduction in rent was made, had completely passed away by the early months of 1945. I am satisfied that the promise was understood by all parties only to apply under the conditions prevailing at the time when it was made, namely, when the flats were only partially let, and that it did not extend any further than that. When the flats became fully let, early in 1945, the reduction ceased to apply. In those circumstances, under the law as I hold it, it seems to me that rent is payable at the full rate for the quarters ending September 29 and December 25, 1945. If the case had been one of estoppel, it might be said that in any event the estoppel would cease when the conditions to which the representation applied came to an end, or it also might be said that it would only come to an end on notice. In either case it is only a way of ascertaining what is the scope of the representation. I prefer to apply the principle that a promise intended to be binding, intended to be acted on and in fact acted on, is binding so far as its terms properly apply(43). Here it was binding as covering the period down to the early part of 1945, and as from that time full rent is payable. I therefore give judgment for the plaintiff company for the amount claimed.
Judgment for plaintiffs.
Solicitors for the plaintiffs: Henry Boustred & Sons. Solicitors for the defendants: Callingham, Griffith & Bates.
Questions to Consider:
1. Why did the plaintiff agree to reduce the rent from ￡2500 to ￡1250?
2. What is the amount that the plaintiff wanted to recover?
3. According to the old common law, could a lease under seal be changed by parol?
4. According to tranditional law, should the equity be applied in the case?
5. Why did Lord Denning say “Jorden v. Monay, can be distinguished”?
6. What is your understanding of “promissory estoppel”? Tell the difference between “promissary estoppel” and “equitable estoppel”.
然而，对于采纳允诺不得反言的制度，英国法院所持的是一种保守的态度。在运用中主要有三点限制：一是受诺人要有损害的存在。这一点是不言而喻的，因为这一规则是救济受诺人的，如果不存在损害当然也就没有运用这一规则的必要。二是禁止反言的期间限制。因为一方当事人作出的允诺是建立在一定条件之上的，如果这一条件不存在时，这一允诺当然不再有效，双方当事人仍按照原来的合同履行各自的义务。在本案中，当战争结束，公寓完全出租时，被告仍要按原租金支付给原告。三是允诺禁止反言的原则不能产生独立的诉权，而只能产生抗辩权。换言之，受诺人不能将这一原则作为剑而主动起诉诺言人，只能将其作为盾阻止诺言人胜诉。在1951年的Combe v. Combe案中，被告丈夫在与原告妻子离婚时同意每年向她支付一笔赡养费，故原告没有向法院提出令被告支付赡养费的要求。后来，原告因一直未得到赡养费而起诉被告。丹宁判决原告败诉。
在州法院审理时，鉴于米兰达未聘请律师，主审法官根据1963年联邦最高法院吉迪恩诉温赖特案（Gideon v. Wainwright, 1963）的判例，指定了一位名叫阿尔文·莫尔（Alvin Moore）的公共辩护律师为米兰达辩护。这位莫尔律师当时已73岁高龄，而且缺乏刑事辩护的经验。但他在开庭时声称，根据宪法第6条修正案以及穷人律师权的判例，嫌犯被捕后，警方就应立即为其提供律师，但本案警方却违反规定，在没有律师在场的情况下审讯米兰达并使其招供。因此，米兰达的供词属于被迫自证其罪，违反了宪法第5条修正案，因而是无效的。但是，亚利桑那州法院以宪法规定的权利尚没有具体规范为由，认定警方获取的米兰达的供词属合法证据，判决米兰达绑架罪和强奸罪成立，分别处以20年和30年监禁，合并执行。
U.S. Supreme Court MIRANDA v. ARIZONA, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) 384 U.S. 436 MIRANDA v. ARIZONA. CERTIORARI(46) TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA. No.759. Argued February 28-March 1, 1966. Decided June 13, 1966.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The cases before us raise questions which go to the roots of our concepts of American criminal jurisprudence: the restraints society must observe consistent with the Federal Constitution in prosecuting individuals for crime. More specifically, we deal with the admissibility of statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation(47) and the necessity for procedures which assure that the individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution(48) not to be compelled to incriminate himself.
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We start here, as we did in Escobedo, with the premise that our holding(49) is not an innovation in our jurisprudence, but is an application of principles long recognized and applied in other settings. We have undertaken a thorough re-examination of the Escobedo decision and the principles it announced, and we reaffirm it. That case was but an explication of basic rights that are enshrined in our Constitution—that “No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,” and that “the accused shall ... have the Assistance of Counsel”—rights which were put in jeopardy in that case through official overbearing. These precious rights were fixed in our Constitution only after centuries of persecution and struggle. And in the words of Chief Justice Marshall, they were secured “for ages to come, and ... designed to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it,” Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 387 (1821).
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Our holding will be spelled out with some specificity in the pages which follow but briefly stated it is this: the prosecution(50) may not use statements, whether exculpatory(51) or inculpatory(52), stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination(53). By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the [384 U.S. 436, 445] process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned.
Ⅰ
The constitutional issue we decide in each of these cases is the admissibility of statements obtained from a defendant questioned while in custody(54) or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. In each, the defendant was questioned by police officers, detectives(55), or a prosecuting attorney(56) in a room in which he was cut off from the outside world. In none of these cases was the defendant given a full and effective warning of his rights at the outset of the interrogation process. In all the cases, the questioning elicited oral admissions, and in three of them, signed statements as well which were admitted at their trials. They all thus share salient features—incommunicado(57) interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional rights.
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Again we stress that the modern practice of in-custody interrogation is psychologically rather than physically oriented. As we have stated before, “Since Chambers v.Florida, [309 U.S.227], this Court has recognized that coercion can be mental as well as physical, and that the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition.” Blackburn v. Alabama, [361 U.S.199, 206 (1960)]. Interrogation still takes place in privacy. Privacy results in secrecy and this in turn results in a gap in our knowledge as to what in fact goes on in the interrogation rooms. A valuable source of information about present police practices, however, may be found in various police manuals and texts which document procedures employed with success in the past, and which recommend various other effective tactics. These [384 U.S.436, 449] texts are used by law enforcement agencies(58) themselves as guides. It should be noted that these texts professedly present the most enlightened and effective means presently used to obtain statements through custodial interrogation. By considering these texts and other data, it is possible to describe procedures observed and noted around the country.
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From these representative samples of interrogation techniques, the setting prescribed by the manuals and observed in practice becomes clear. In essence, it is this: To be alone with the subject is essential to prevent distraction and to deprive him of any outside support. The aura of confidence in his guilt undermines his will to resist. He merely confirms the preconceived story the police seek to have him describe. Patience and persistence, at times relentless questioning, are employed. To obtain a confession, the interrogator must “patiently maneuver himself or his quarry into a position from which the desired objective may be attained.” When normal procedures fail to produce the needed result, the police may resort to deceptive stratagems such as giving false legal advice. It is important to keep the subject off balance, for example, by trading on his insecurity about himself or his surroundings. The police then persuade, trick, or cajole him out of exercising his constitutional rights.
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In the cases before us today, given this background, we concern ourselves primarily with this interrogation atmosphere and the evils it can bring. In No.759, Miranda v. Arizona, the police arrested the defendant and took him to a special interrogation room where they secured a confession. In No.760, Vignera v. New York, the defendant made oral admissions to the police after interrogation in the afternoon, and then signed an inculpatory statement upon being questioned by an assistant district attorney later the same evening. In No.761, Westover v. United States, the defendant was handed over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation(59) by [384 U.S. 436, 457] local authorities after they had detained and interrogated him for a lengthy period, both at night and the following morning. After some two hours of questioning, the federal officers had obtained signed statements from the defendant. Lastly, in No.584, California v.Stewart, the local police held the defendant five days in the station and interrogated him on nine separate occasions before they secured his inculpatory statement.
In these cases, we might not find the defendants' statements to have been involuntary in traditional terms. Our concern for adequate safeguards to protect precious Fifth Amendment rights is, of course, not lessened in the slightest. In each of the cases, the defendant was thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and run through menacing police interrogation procedures. The potentiality for compulsion is forcefully apparent, for example, in Miranda, where the indigent Mexican defendant was a seriously disturbed individual with pronounced sexual fantasies, and in Stewart, in which the defendant was an indigent Los Angeles Negro who had dropped out of school in the sixth grade. To be sure, the records do not evince overt physical coercion(60) or patent psychological ploys. The fact remains that in none of these cases did the officers undertake to afford appropriate safeguards at the outset of the interrogation to insure that the statements were truly the product of free choice.
It is obvious that such an interrogation environment is created for no purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner(61). This atmosphere carries its own badge of intimidation(62). To be sure, this is not physical intimidation, but it is equally destructive of human dignity. The current practice of incommunicado interrogation is at odds with one of our [384 U.S. 436, 458] Nation's most cherished principles-that the individual may not be compelled to incriminate himself. Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice.
From the foregoing, we can readily perceive an intimate connection between the privilege against self-incrimination and police custodial questioning. It is fitting to turn to history and precedent underlying the Self-Incrimination Clause to determine its applicability in this situation.
Ⅱ
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Thus we may view the historical development of the privilege as one which groped for the proper scope of governmental power over the citizen. As a “noble principle often transcends its origins,” the privilege has come rightfully to be recognized in part as an individual's substantive right(63), a “right to a private enclave where he may lead a private life. That right is the hallmark of our democracy.” United States v. Grunewald, [233 F.2d 556, 579, 581—582, rev'd, 353 U.S. 391 (1957)]. We have recently noted that the privilege against self-incrimination—the essential mainstay of our adversary system—is founded on a complex of values, Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, [378 U.S. 52, 55—57, n.5 (1964)]; Tehan v. Shott, [382 U.S. 406, 414—415, n.12 (1966)]. All these policies point to one overriding thought: the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government—state or federal—must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens. To maintain a “fair state-individual balance,” to require the government “to shoulder the entire load,” 8 Wigmore, Evidence 317 (McNaughton rev. 1961), to respect the inviolability of the human personality, our accusatory system of criminal justice demands that the government seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence against him by its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from his own mouth. Chambers v. Florida, [309 U.S. 227, 235—238 (1940)]. In sum, the privilege is fulfilled only when the person is guaranteed the right “to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will.” Malloy v. Hogan, [378 U.S.1, 8 (1964)].
The question in these cases is whether the privilege is fully applicable during a period of custodial interrogation.[384 U.S.436, 461] In this Court, the privilege has consistently been accorded a liberal construction. Albertson v. SACB, [382 U.S.70, 81 (1965)]; Hoffman v. United States, [341 U.S.479, 486(1951)]; Arndstein v. McCarthy, [254 U.S.71, 72—73(1920)]; Counselman v.Hitchock, [142 U.S.547, 562 (1892)]. We are satisfied that all the principles embodied in the privilege apply to informal compulsion(64) exerted by law-enforcement officers during in-custody questioning. An individual swept from familiar surroundings into police custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques of persuasion described above cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to speak. As a practical matter, the compulsion to speak in the isolated setting of the police station may well be greater than in courts or other official investigations, where there are often impartial observers to guard against intimidation or trickery.
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Ⅲ
Today, then, there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal court proceedings(65) and serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves. We have concluded that without proper safeguards the process of incustody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely. In order to combat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored.
It is impossible for us to foresee the potential alternatives for protecting the privilege which might be devised by Congress or the States in the exercise of their creative rule-making capacities. Therefore we cannot say that the Constitution necessarily requires adherence to any particular solution for the inherent compulsions of the interrogation process as it is presently conducted. Our decision in no way creates a constitutional straitjacket which will handicap sound efforts at reform, nor is it intended to have this effect. We encourage Congress and the States to continue their laudable search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the rights of the individual while promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal laws. However, unless we are shown other procedures which are at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following safeguards must be observed.
At the outset, if a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he must first be informed in clear and [384 U.S.436, 468] unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent. For those unaware of the privilege, the warning is needed simply to make them aware of itthe threshold requirement for an intelligent decision as to its exercise. More important, such a warning is an absolute prerequisite in overcoming the inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere. It is not just the subnormal or woefully ignorant who succumb to an interrogator's imprecations, whether implied or expressly stated, that the interrogation will continue until a confession is obtained or that silence in the face of accusation is itself damning(66) and will bode ill when presented to a jury. Further, the warning will show the individual that his interrogators are prepared to recognize his privilege should he choose to exercise it.
The Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental to our system of constitutional rule and the expedient of giving an adequate warning as to the availability of the privilege so simple, we will not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was aware of his rights without a warning being given. Assessments of the knowledge the defendant possessed, based on information [384 U.S.436, 469] as to his age, education, intelligence, or prior contact with authorities, can never be more than speculation; a warning is a clearcut fact. More important, whatever the background of the person interrogated, a warning at the time of the interrogation is indispensable to overcome its pressures and to insure that the individual knows he is free to exercise the privilege at that point in time.
The warning of the right to remain silent must be accompanied by the explanation that anything said can and will be used against the individual in court. This warning is needed in order to make him aware not only of the privilege, but also of the consequences of forgoing it. It is only through an awareness of these consequences that there can be any assurance of real understanding and intelligent exercise of the privilege. Moreover, this warning may serve to make the individual more acutely aware that he is faced with a phase of the adversary system(67)—that he is not in the presence of persons acting solely in his interest.
The circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear the will of one merely made aware of his privilege by his interrogators. Therefore, the right to have counsel(68) present at the interrogation is indispensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege under the system we delineate today. Our aim is to assure that the individual's right to choose between silence and speech remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process. A once-stated warning, delivered by those who will conduct the interrogation, cannot itself suffice to that end among those who most require knowledge of their rights. A mere [384 U.S. 436, 470] warning given by the interrogators is not alone sufficient to accomplish that end. Prosecutors themselves claim that the admonishment of the right to remain silent without more “will benefit only the recidivist and the professional.” Brief for the National District Attorneys Association as amicus curiae(69), p.14. Even preliminary advice given to the accused by his own attorney can be swiftly overcome by the secret interrogation process. Cf. Escobedo v. Illinois, [378 U.S. 478, 485 , n.5]. Thus, the need for counsel to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege comprehends not merely a right to consult with counsel prior to questioning, but also to have counsel present during any questioning if the defendant so desires.
The presence of counsel at the interrogation may serve several significant subsidiary functions as well. If the accused decides to talk to his interrogators, the assistance of counsel can mitigate the dangers of untrustworthiness. With a lawyer present the likelihood that the police will practice coercion is reduced, and if coercion is nevertheless exercised the lawyer can testify to it in court. The presence of a lawyer can also help to guarantee that the accused gives a fully accurate statement to the police and that the statement is rightly reported by the prosecution at trial. See Crooker v.California, [357 U.S.433, 443—448 (1958) (DOUGLAS, J., dissenting)].
An individual need not make a pre-interrogation request for a lawyer. While such request affirmatively secures his right to have one, his failure to ask for a lawyer does not constitute a waiver. No effective waiver of the right to counsel during interrogation can be recognized unless specifically made after the warnings we here delineate have been given. The accused who does not know his rights and therefore does not make a request [384 U.S.436, 471] may be the person who most needs counsel.
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Accordingly we hold that an individual held for interrogation must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation under the system for protecting the privilege we delineate today. As with the warnings of the right to remain silent and that anything stated can be used in evidence against him, this warning is an absolute prerequisite to interrogation. No amount of [384 U.S.436, 472] circumstantial evidence(70) that the person may have been aware of this right will suffice to stand in its stead: Only through such a warning is there ascertainable assurance that the accused was aware of this right.
If an individual indicates that he wishes the assistance of counsel before any interrogation occurs, the authorities cannot rationally ignore or deny his request on the basis that the individual does not have or cannot afford a retained attorney. The financial ability of the individual has no relationship to the scope of the rights involved here. The privilege against self-incrimination secured by the Constitution applies to all individuals. The need for counsel in order to protect the privilege exists for the indigent as well as the affluent. In fact, were we to limit these constitutional rights to those who can retain an attorney, our decisions today would be of little significance. The cases before us as well as the vast majority of confession cases with which we have dealt in the past involve those unable to retain counsel. While authorities are not required to relieve the accused of his poverty, they have the obligation not to take advantage of indigence in the administration of justice. Denial [384 U.S.436, 473] of counsel to the indigent at the time of interrogation while allowing an attorney to those who can afford one would be no more supportable by reason or logic than the similar situation at trial and on appeal(71) struck down in Gideon v. Wainwright, [372 U.S.335(1963)], and Douglas v. California, [372 U.S.353(1963)].
In order fully to apprise a person interrogated of the extent of his rights under this system then, it is necessary to warn him not only that he has the right to consult with an attorney, but also that if he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. Without this additional warning, the admonition of the right to consult with counsel would often be understood as meaning only that he can consult with a lawyer if he has one or has the funds to obtain one. The warning of a right to counsel would be hollow if not couched in terms that would convey to the indigent—the person most often subjected to interrogation—the knowledge that he too has a right to have counsel present. As with the warnings of the right to remain silent and of the general right to counsel, only by effective and express explanation to the indigent of this right can there be assurance that he was truly in a position to exercise it.
Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, [384 U.S.436, 474] at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked. If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent questioning. If the individual cannot obtain an attorney and he indicates that he wants one before speaking to police, they must respect his decision to remain silent.
This does not mean, as some have suggested, that each police station must have a “station house lawyer” present at all times to advise prisoners. It does mean, however, that if police propose to interrogate a person they must make known to him that he is entitled to a lawyer and that if he cannot afford one, a lawyer will be provided for him prior to any interrogation. If authorities conclude that they will not provide counsel during a reasonable period of time in which investigation in the field is carried out, they may refrain from doing so without violating the person's Fifth Amendment privilege so long as they do not question him during that time. [384 U.S.436, 475]
If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel. Escobedo v. Illinois, [378 U.S.478, 490, n.14]. This Court has always set high standards of proof for the waiver of constitutional rights, Johnson v. Zerbst, [304 U.S.458 (1938)], and we re-assert these standards as applied to incustody interrogation. Since the State is responsible for establishing the isolated circumstances under which the interrogation takes place and has the only means of making available corroborated(72) evidence of warnings given during incommunicado interrogation, the burden is rightly on its shoulders.
An express statement that the individual is willing to make a statement and does not want an attorney followed closely by a statement could constitute a waiver. But a valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are given or simply from the fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained.
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Whatever the testimony(73) of the authorities as to waiver of rights by an accused, the fact of lengthy interrogation or incommunicado incarceration before a statement is made is strong evidence that the accused did not validly waive his rights. In these circumstances the fact that the individual eventually made a statement is consistent with the conclusion that the compelling influence of the interrogation finally forced him to do so. It is inconsistent with any notion of a voluntary relinquishment(74) of the privilege. Moreover, any evidence that the accused was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will, of course, show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his privilege. The requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is a fundamental with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege and not simply a preliminary ritual to existing methods of interrogation.
The warnings required and the waiver necessary in accordance with our opinion today are, in the absence of a fully effective equivalent, prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement made by a defendant. No distinction can be drawn between statements which are direct confessions(75) and statements which amount to “admissions” of part or all of an offense. The privilege against selfincrimination protects the individual from being compelled to incriminate himself in any manner; it does not distinguish degrees of incrimination. Similarly, [384 U.S.436, 477] for precisely the same reason, no distinction may be drawn between inculpatory statements and statements alleged to be merely “exculpatory.” If a statement made were in fact truly exculpatory it would, of course, never be used by the prosecution. In fact, statements merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are often used to impeach(76) his testimony at trial or to demonstrate untruths in the statement given under interrogation and thus to prove guilt by implication(77). These statements are incriminating in any meaningful sense of the word and may not be used without the full warnings and effective waiver required for any other statement. In Escobedo itself, the defendant fully intended his accusation(78) of another as the slayer to be exculpatory as to himself.
The principles announced today deal with the protection which must be given to the privilege against self-incrimination when the individual is first subjected to police interrogation while in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. It is at this point that our adversary system of criminal proceedings commences, distinguishing itself at the outset from the inquisitorial system(79) recognized in some countries. Under the system of warnings we delineate today or under any other system which may be devised and found effective, the safeguards to be erected about the privilege must come into play at this point.
Our decision is not intended to hamper the traditional function of police officers in investigating crime. See Escobedo v. Illinois, [378 U.S.478, 492]. When an individual is in custody on probable cause, the police may, of course, seek out evidence in the field to be used at trial against him. Such investigation may include inquiry of persons not under restraint(80). General on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process is not affected by our holding. It is an act of [384 U.S.436, 478] responsible citizenship for individuals to give whatever information they may have to aid in law enforcement. In such situations the compelling atmosphere inherent in the process of incustody interrogation is not necessarily present.
In dealing with statements obtained through interrogation, we do not purport to find all confessions inadmissible. Confessions remain a proper element in law enforcement. Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence. The fundamental import of the privilege while an individual is in custody is not whether he is allowed to talk to the police without the benefit of warnings and counsel, but whether he can be interrogated. There is no requirement that police stop a person who enters a police station and states that he wishes to confess to a crime, or a person who calls the police to offer a confession or any other statement he desires to make. Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by our holding today.
To summarize, we hold that when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized. Procedural safeguards must be employed to [384 U.S.436, 479] protect the privilege, and unless other fully effective means are adopted to notify the person of his right of silence and to assure that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously honored, the following measures are required. He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.
Ⅳ
A recurrent argument made in these cases is that society's need for interrogation outweighs the privilege. This argument is not unfamiliar to this Court. See, e. g., Chambers v. Florida, [309 U.S. 227, 240—241 (1940)]. The whole thrust of our foregoing discussion demonstrates that the Constitution has prescribed the rights of the individual when confronted with the power of government when it provided in the Fifth Amendment that an individual cannot be compelled to be a witness(81) against himself. That right cannot be abridged.
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In this connection, one of our country's distinguished jurists(82) has pointed out: “The quality of a nation's civilization can be largely measured by the methods it uses in the enforcement of its criminal law.”
If the individual desires to exercise his privilege, he has the right to do so. This is not for the authorities to decide. An attorney may advise his client not to talk to police until he has had an opportunity to investigate the case, or he may wish to be present with his client during any police questioning. In doing so an attorney is merely exercising the good professional judgment he has been taught. This is not cause for considering the attorney a menace to law enforcement. He is merely carrying out what he is sworn to do under his oath—to protect to the extent of his ability the rights of his [384 U.S.436, 481] client. In fulfilling this responsibility the attorney plays a vital role in the administration of criminal justice under our Constitution.
In announcing these principles, we are not unmindful of the burdens which law enforcement officials must bear, often under trying circumstances. We also fully recognize the obligation of all citizens to aid in enforcing the criminal laws. This Court, while protecting individual rights, has always given ample latitude to law enforcement agencies in the legitimate exercise of their duties. The limits we have placed on the interrogation process should not constitute an undue interference with a proper system of law enforcement. As we have noted, our decision does not in any way preclude police from carrying out their traditional investigatory functions. Although confessions may play an important role in some convictions(83), the cases before us present graphic examples of the overstatement of the “need” for confessions. In each case authorities conducted interrogations ranging up to five days in duration despite the presence, through standard investigating practices, of considerable evidence against each defendant. Further examples are chronicled in our prior cases. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, [373 U.S. 503, 518—519 (1963)]; Rogers v. Richmond, [365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961)]; Malinski v. New York, [324 U.S. 401, 402 (1945)]. [384 U.S. 436, 482]
It is also urged that an unfettered right to detention(84) for interrogation should be allowed because it will often redound to the benefit of the person questioned. When police inquiry determines that there is no reason to believe that the person has committed any crime, it is said, he will be released without need for further formal procedures. The person who has committed no offense(85), however, will be better able to clear himself after warnings with counsel present than without. It can be assumed that in such circumstances a lawyer would advise his client to talk freely to police in order to clear himself.
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Over the years the Federal Bureau of Investigation has compiled an exemplary record of effective law enforcement while advising any suspect or arrested person, at the outset of an interview, that he is not required to make a statement, that any statement may be used against him in court, that the individual may obtain the services of an attorney of his own choice and, more recently, that he has a right to free counsel if he is unable to pay. A letter received from the Solicitor General(86) in response to a question from the Bench(87) makes it clear that the present pattern of warnings and respect for the [384 U.S. 436, 484] rights of the individual followed as a practice by the FBI is consistent with the procedure which we delineate today.
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The experience in some other countries also suggests that the danger to law enforcement in curbs on interrogation is overplayed. The English procedure since 1912 under the Judges'Rules(88) is significant. As recently [384 U.S.436, 487] strengthened, the Rules require that a cautionary warning be given an accused by a police officer as soon as he has evidence that affords reasonable grounds for suspicion; they also require that any statement made be given by the accused without questioning by police. [384 U.S.436, 488] The right of the individual to consult with an attorney during this period is expressly recognized.
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It is also urged upon us that we withhold decision on this issue until state legislative bodies and advisory groups have had an opportunity to deal with these problems by rule making. We have already pointed out that the Constitution does not require any specific code of procedures for protecting the privilege against self-incrimination during custodial interrogation. Congress and the States are free to develop their own safeguards for the privilege, so long as they are fully as effective as those described above in informing accused persons of their right of silence and in affording a continuous opportunity to exercise it. In any event, however, the issues presented are of constitutional dimensions and must be determined by the courts. The admissibility of a statement in the face of a claim that it was obtained in violation of the defendant's constitutional rights is an issue the resolution of which has long since been undertaken by this Court. See Hopt v. Utah, [110 U.S. 574 (1884)]. Judicial solutions to problems of constitutional dimension have evolved decade by decade. As courts have been presented with the need to enforce constitutional rights, they have found means of doing so. That was our responsibility when Escobedo was before us and it is our [384 U.S.436, 491] responsibility today. Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them.
Ⅴ
Because of the nature of the problem and because of its recurrent significance in numerous cases, we have to this point discussed the relationship of the Fifth Amendment privilege to police interrogation without specific concentration on the facts of the cases before us. We turn now to these facts to consider the application to these cases of the constitutional principles discussed above. In each instance, we have concluded that statements were obtained from the defendant under circumstances that did not meet constitutional standards for protection of the privilege.
No.759. Miranda v.Arizona.
On March 13, 1963, petitioner, Ernesto Miranda, was arrested at his home and taken in custody to a Phoenix police station. He was there identified by the complaining witness. The police then took him to “Interrogation Room No.2” of the detective bureau. There he was questioned by two police officers. The officers admitted at trial that Miranda was not advised that he had a right to have an attorney present. Two hours later, the [384 U.S. 436, 492] officers emerged from the interrogation room with a written confession signed by Miranda. At the top of the statement was a typed paragraph stating that the confession was made voluntarily, without threats or promises of immunity and “with full knowledge of my legal rights, understanding any statement I make may be used against me.”
At his trial before a jury, the written confession was admitted into evidence over the objection of defense counsel, and the officers testified(89) to the prior oral confession made by Miranda during the interrogation. Miranda was found guilty of kidnapping(90) and rape(91). He was sentenced(92) to 20 to 30 years’ imprisonment(93) on each count(94), the sentences(95) to run concurrently. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona held that Miranda's constitutional rights were not violated in obtaining the confession and affirmed(96) the conviction. In reaching its decision, the court emphasized heavily the fact that Miranda did not specifically request counsel.
We reverse. From the testimony of the officers and by the admission of respondent(97), it is clear that Miranda was not in any way apprised of his right to consult with an attorney and to have one present during the interrogation, nor was his right not to be compelled to incriminate himself effectively protected in any other manner. Without these warnings the statements were inadmissible. The mere fact that he signed a statement which contained a typedin clause stating that he had “full knowledge” of his “legal rights” does not approach the knowing and intelligent waiver required to relinquish constitutional rights.
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Therefore, in accordance with the foregoing, the judgments of the Supreme Court of Arizona in No.759, of the New York Court of Appeals in No.760, and of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit(98) in No.761 are reversed. The judgment of the Supreme Court of California in No.584 is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Questions to Consider:
1. What are the main contents of the Miranda Warnings?
2. What is the constitutional basis of the Miranda Warnings?
3. What are the main functions of the presence of counsel when the accused is interrogated?
4. If an individual indicates that he wishes the assistance of counsel before any interrogation occurs, but he can not afford a retained attorney, can the authorities ignore or deny his request?
5. If an individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, what shall the authorities do?
6. Who shall take the burden of proof to demonstrate the defendant's waiver of his privilege, knowingly and intelligently, against selfincrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel?
7. What are the consequences of the authorities failure to give the Miranda Warnings?
第三部分［判例影响及意义综述］
1964年，针对美国各州和地方警务人员在实际办案过程中罔顾程序、滥用权力现象较为严重的问题，联邦最高法院在马洛伊诉霍根（Malloy v. Hogan，1964）案中宣布，宪法第五条修正案关于“不自证其罪”的条款属于宪法第十四条修正案中各州应遵循的“正当法律程序”的一部分，犯罪嫌疑人的“非自愿供词”在州法院审判时一概无效。但是，究竟什么样的供词属于“非自愿供词”？各州警方应如何在日常执法过程中防止出现“非自愿供词”？对于这些细节，联邦最高法院在上述案例中并未予以详细说明和具体解释。这样一来，各州警务人员“执法犯法”、侵犯公民宪法权利的状况并无明显改善。与此同时，“民权运动”和“权利革命”在美国社会风起云涌。
(22) a lease under seal：盖印租约，属于盖印合同（contract under seal）的一种，是英美合同法上的一种以特殊形式达成的合同。在英国法律的早期，只有盖印合同才在法律上是可执行的，其他合同（包括一般的书面合同）法院原则上并不承认其效力。盖印合同的达成要求当事人以书面记载，对文本进行蜡封并盖上印章，并且须交付给对方当事人。后来蜡封盖印的形式被简化，通常在合同上印上“seal”或者“L．S．（拉丁文Locus sigilli的简写）”即可。盖印合同是正式合同，非正式合同（英美法常称简式合同simple Contract）后来逐渐被法院承认有执行力，但必须有约因存在。但盖印合同作为正式合同，即使没有约因也可以成立。盖印合同和简式合同还有其他很多方面的区别，但逐渐地都消灭了。在美国已经有很多州通过制定法完全废除了盖印合同，也就是说合同在成立要件上都需要遵循一般规则，不再有盖印合同这一种特别方式。
(32) 一般来说，法律上并不规定哪些合同应当用盖印合同的方式，是由当事人决定将他们认为有必要的合同以盖印合同的方式达成。在这里所说的衡平法原则之下，对于一个盖印合同，原则上可以用书面或者口头的协议加以变更。但是，法律（Statute of Frauds）规定几类合同必须采用书面形式，则如果当事人是用盖印合同方式达成这样一个合同，那么变更它的协议虽不必采用盖印合同方式，但至少必须采用书面形式。
(38) “Joeden v．Money can be distinguished”，此处译为“Jorden v．Money案中的事实与这些判例并不相同”。英美法的核心制度是遵循先例原则（the doctrine of Stare Decisis），一个判例中针对特定事实所适用的法律规则，在以后审理事实实质相同的案件中，应当同样适用。但如果两个案件的事实在实质上并不相同，则自然不应适用相同的法律规则。分析两个案件的事实并认为它们有根本区别，就称为distinguish。
(39) common law：普通法。指起源于英格兰，由拥有高级裁判权的王室法院依据古老的地方性习惯，或是理性、自然、公正、常理、公共政策等原则，通过“遵循先例”（stare decisis）的司法原则，在不同时期的判例基础上发展起来的，具备司法连贯性特征并在一定的司法共同体内普遍使用的各种原则、规则等的总称。在法律实践中，他主要指那些由判例报道（law reporting）加以记录而能够得以援用的部分。作为法律渊源，普通法区别于由立法机关制定颁行的成文法律，实际上由法院即法官创制，又称为“法院/法官创制的法律”。因其根据判例而发展，故实际上是“判例法”（case law）。
(59) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)：（美）联邦调查局。成立于1908年，负责调查除法律、条例规定由其他联邦机构管辖之外的所有违反联邦法律的案件。其管辖范围涉及刑事、民事及国家安全领域，包括间谍、颠覆及其他危害国家安全的破坏活动、绑架、敲诈勒索、抢劫银行、州际赃物转运、公民权事务、州际投机活动、蒙骗政府、袭击或杀害总统或联邦官员等案件。此外，它还是一个服务性机构，提供诸如鉴定指纹、训练警官等服务。
