【19下】管理经济学

邱向东

目录

  • 1 Introduction
    • 1.1 Managerial Decision Making
    • 1.2 Economic Models
  • 2 Supply and Demand
    • 2.1 Demand
    • 2.2 Supply
    • 2.3 Market Equilibrium
    • 2.4 Shocks to the Equilibrium
    • 2.5 Effects of Government Interventions
    • 2.6 When to Use the Supply-and-Demand Model
  • 3 Empirical Methods for Demand Analysis
    • 3.1 Elasticity
    • 3.2 Regression Analysis
    • 3.3 Properties and Statistical Significance of Estimated Coefficients
    • 3.4 Regression Specification
    • 3.5 Forecasting
  • 4 Consumer Choice
    • 4.1 Consumer Preferences
    • 4.2 Utility
    • 4.3 The Budget Constraint
    • 4.4 Constrained Consumer Choice
    • 4.5 Deriving Demand Curves
    • 4.6 Behavioral Economics
  • 5 Production
    • 5.1 Production Functions
    • 5.2 Short-Run Production
    • 5.3 Long-Run Production
    • 5.4 Returns to Scale
    • 5.5 Productivity and Technological Change
  • 6 Costs
    • 6.1 The Nature of Costs
    • 6.2 Short-Run Costs
    • 6.3 Long-Run Costs
    • 6.4 The Learning Curve
    • 6.5 The Costs of Producing Multiple Goods
  • 7 Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • 7.1 Ownership and Governance of Firms
    • 7.2 Profit Maximization
    • 7.3 Owners’ Versus Managers’ Objectives
    • 7.4 The Make or Buy Decision
    • 7.5 Market Structure
  • 8 Competitive Firms and Markets
    • 8.1 Perfect Competition
    • 8.2 Competition in the Short Run
    • 8.3 Competition in the Long Run
    • 8.4 Competition Maximizes Economic Well-Being
  • 9 Monopoly
    • 9.1 Monopoly Profit Maximization
    • 9.2 Market Power
    • 9.3 Market Failure Due to Monopoly Pricing
    • 9.4 Causes of Monopoly
    • 9.5 Advertising
    • 9.6 Networks, Dynamics, and Behavioral Economics
  • 10 Pricing with Market Power
    • 10.1 Conditions for Price Discrimination
    • 10.2 Perfect Price Discrimination
    • 10.3 Group Price Discrimination
    • 10.4 Nonlinear Price Discrimination
    • 10.5 Two-Part Pricing
    • 10.6 Bundling
    • 10.7 Peak-Load Pricing
  • 11 Oligopoly and Monopolistic Competition
    • 11.1 Cartels
    • 11.2 Cournot Oligopoly
    • 11.3 Bertrand Oligopoly
    • 11.4 Monopolistic Competition
  • 12 Game Theory and Business Strategy
    • 12.1 Oligopoly Games
    • 12.2 Types of Nash Equilibria
    • 12.3 Information and Rationality
    • 12.4 Bargaining
    • 12.5 Auctions
  • 13 Strategies over Time
    • 13.1 Repeated Games
    • 13.2 Sequential Games
    • 13.3 Deterring Entry
    • 13.4 Cost Strategies
    • 13.5 Disadvantages of Moving First
    • 13.6 Behavioral Game Theory
  • 14 Managerial Decision Making Under Certainty
    • 14.1 Assessing Risk
    • 14.2 Attitudes Toward Risk
    • 14.3 Reducing Risk
    • 14.4 Investing Under Uncertainty
    • 14.5 Behavioral Economics and Uncertainty
  • 15 Asymmetric Information
    • 15.1 Adverse Selection
    • 15.2 Reducing Adverse Selection
    • 15.3 Moral Hazard
    • 15.4 Using Contracts to Reduce Moral Hazard
    • 15.5 Using Monitoring to Reduce Moral Hazard
  • 16 Government and Business
    • 16.1 Market Failure and Government Policy
    • 16.2 Regulation of Imperfectly Competitive Markets
    • 16.3 Antitrust Law and Competition Policy
    • 16.4 Externalities
    • 16.5 Open-Access, Club, and Public Goods
    • 16.6 Intellectual Property
  • 17 Global Business
    • 17.1 Reasons for International Trade
    • 17.2 Exchange Rates
    • 17.3 International Trade Policies
    • 17.4 Multinational Enterprises
    • 17.5 Outsourcing
Reasons for International Trade

Reasons for International Trade: This section presents the standard analysis of comparative advantage as a motivation for international trade.  How much time is devoted to this discussion will largely be a function of the background of the class, but a short presentation of a 2x2 example will serve as a review for students who have covered the material in the past and is also simple enough to introduce students who are new to the topic.