【19下】管理经济学

邱向东

目录

  • 1 Introduction
    • 1.1 Managerial Decision Making
    • 1.2 Economic Models
  • 2 Supply and Demand
    • 2.1 Demand
    • 2.2 Supply
    • 2.3 Market Equilibrium
    • 2.4 Shocks to the Equilibrium
    • 2.5 Effects of Government Interventions
    • 2.6 When to Use the Supply-and-Demand Model
  • 3 Empirical Methods for Demand Analysis
    • 3.1 Elasticity
    • 3.2 Regression Analysis
    • 3.3 Properties and Statistical Significance of Estimated Coefficients
    • 3.4 Regression Specification
    • 3.5 Forecasting
  • 4 Consumer Choice
    • 4.1 Consumer Preferences
    • 4.2 Utility
    • 4.3 The Budget Constraint
    • 4.4 Constrained Consumer Choice
    • 4.5 Deriving Demand Curves
    • 4.6 Behavioral Economics
  • 5 Production
    • 5.1 Production Functions
    • 5.2 Short-Run Production
    • 5.3 Long-Run Production
    • 5.4 Returns to Scale
    • 5.5 Productivity and Technological Change
  • 6 Costs
    • 6.1 The Nature of Costs
    • 6.2 Short-Run Costs
    • 6.3 Long-Run Costs
    • 6.4 The Learning Curve
    • 6.5 The Costs of Producing Multiple Goods
  • 7 Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • 7.1 Ownership and Governance of Firms
    • 7.2 Profit Maximization
    • 7.3 Owners’ Versus Managers’ Objectives
    • 7.4 The Make or Buy Decision
    • 7.5 Market Structure
  • 8 Competitive Firms and Markets
    • 8.1 Perfect Competition
    • 8.2 Competition in the Short Run
    • 8.3 Competition in the Long Run
    • 8.4 Competition Maximizes Economic Well-Being
  • 9 Monopoly
    • 9.1 Monopoly Profit Maximization
    • 9.2 Market Power
    • 9.3 Market Failure Due to Monopoly Pricing
    • 9.4 Causes of Monopoly
    • 9.5 Advertising
    • 9.6 Networks, Dynamics, and Behavioral Economics
  • 10 Pricing with Market Power
    • 10.1 Conditions for Price Discrimination
    • 10.2 Perfect Price Discrimination
    • 10.3 Group Price Discrimination
    • 10.4 Nonlinear Price Discrimination
    • 10.5 Two-Part Pricing
    • 10.6 Bundling
    • 10.7 Peak-Load Pricing
  • 11 Oligopoly and Monopolistic Competition
    • 11.1 Cartels
    • 11.2 Cournot Oligopoly
    • 11.3 Bertrand Oligopoly
    • 11.4 Monopolistic Competition
  • 12 Game Theory and Business Strategy
    • 12.1 Oligopoly Games
    • 12.2 Types of Nash Equilibria
    • 12.3 Information and Rationality
    • 12.4 Bargaining
    • 12.5 Auctions
  • 13 Strategies over Time
    • 13.1 Repeated Games
    • 13.2 Sequential Games
    • 13.3 Deterring Entry
    • 13.4 Cost Strategies
    • 13.5 Disadvantages of Moving First
    • 13.6 Behavioral Game Theory
  • 14 Managerial Decision Making Under Certainty
    • 14.1 Assessing Risk
    • 14.2 Attitudes Toward Risk
    • 14.3 Reducing Risk
    • 14.4 Investing Under Uncertainty
    • 14.5 Behavioral Economics and Uncertainty
  • 15 Asymmetric Information
    • 15.1 Adverse Selection
    • 15.2 Reducing Adverse Selection
    • 15.3 Moral Hazard
    • 15.4 Using Contracts to Reduce Moral Hazard
    • 15.5 Using Monitoring to Reduce Moral Hazard
  • 16 Government and Business
    • 16.1 Market Failure and Government Policy
    • 16.2 Regulation of Imperfectly Competitive Markets
    • 16.3 Antitrust Law and Competition Policy
    • 16.4 Externalities
    • 16.5 Open-Access, Club, and Public Goods
    • 16.6 Intellectual Property
  • 17 Global Business
    • 17.1 Reasons for International Trade
    • 17.2 Exchange Rates
    • 17.3 International Trade Policies
    • 17.4 Multinational Enterprises
    • 17.5 Outsourcing
Bargaining

Bargaining: Far and away the most important idea in this section is that it considers cooperative games, as opposed to the noncooperative game theory discussed up to this point.  Students are usually very glad to learn that game theory has a method for analyzing these kinds of situations.  The technical details of the Nash bargaining problem are interesting as well and a complete treatment will include helping students work through an example like the one on pp. 413-414.